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Lubet: Judicial Independence and Independent Judges

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND
INDEPENDENT JUDGES
Steven Lubet*
It is easy to believe in judicial independence, but it seems much
harder to appreciate independent judges.
As an abstract principal, judicial independence ranks high in our
constellation of democratic values-ight up there with freedom of
speech, the sanctity of the home, and the right to counsel. And well it
should, since all other rights would be diminished, perhaps even
forfeited, in the absence of judges capable of resisting the will of
government or the pressure of popular sentiment. It is the independent
judge, loyal only to the rule of law, who protects our constitutional
liberties, who ensures fairness, and who stands guard against the excesses
of those in power.
As Justice Jackson observed at the height of the Cold War and the
depth of the McCarthy era:
Severe substantive laws can be endured if they are fairly and
impartially applied. Indeed, if put to the choice, one might well prefer
to live under Soviet substantive law applied in good faith by our
common-law procedures than under our substantive law enforced by
Soviet procedural practices.'
In other words, freedom rests upon the application of the law at
least as much as it does upon the precise content of the law. In turn,
application of the law rests upon the existence of judges who are
unconstrained by other forces-who are, as we say, independent.
So much for the high-minded civics lesson. The concrete story of
judicial independence is acted out more in the trenches than in the pages
of the law journals or political science texts. Real-life intrusions on
judicial independence come in many forms and at every level. Although
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
1. Shaughmessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
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these intrusions occur most often when a judge does something notably
unpopular or controversial, it would be a mistake to believe that judicial
independence is threatened only by demagogues or neanderthals. Rather,
the dangers may come from any number of directions, some more subtle
than others.
For example, I once had the occasion to attend a judicial disciplinary proceeding2 at which the respondent-judge was charged with having
violated the due process rights of a criminal defendant. The judge, on his
own motion, had ordered an ex parte "security hearing" in which he
considered proposed precautions to be taken in the courtroom against the
possibility that the defendant might attempt to escape.3 Both the
defendant and his lawyer were excluded from the security hearing. A
complaint was made to the state judicial conduct commission, charging
the judge with misconduct.
The case against the judge was set for trial before a panel of judges,
lawyers, and lay representatives. The respondent-judge argued that
regardless of whether he was right or wrong in holding the ex parte
hearing, he could not be disciplined for his good faith efforts in applying
the law as he understood it. Called as an expert witness, I agreed with
the respondent-judge's assessment. I testified that the principle ofjudicial
independence would be damaged ifjudges were subject to reprimand on
the basis of errors made in the course of judging. In ordinary circumstances, judges should not have to fear punishment in the event that their
rulings are later determined to be mistaken.
The panel chair was skeptical. "How could it possibly threaten
judicial independence," the chair wanted to know, "if we merely insist
that judges respect the Due Process Clause?" Such an oversimplified
query typified the general sentiment of the entire panel. "No one wants
to infringe on independence," they implied, "but why not discipline a
judge who violates basic rights?"4
The answer is at once both elusive and apparent. Judges should not
feel free to trample on defendants' rights. However, at least when the
judge has manifestly acted in good faith, the constraint should come from
the judge's understanding of the law itself, and not from fear of

2. This case was never reported. However, a squib description may be found in JEFFREY M.
SHAMAN,STEVEN LuBEr & JAMEs J. ALFiI, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 5.01, at 150 n.1 1
(2d ed. 1995).
3. It seemed uncontroverted that the defendant was an escape risk.

4. In the event, the state judicial commission decided not to discipline the respondent-judge
for that conduct. See id.
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discipline. An independent judge is one whose sole concern is about
the quality of his or her judging, not about the acceptability of his
or her ultimate decision. A judge who has to worry about personal
consequences is not truly independent. Just as the First Amendment
works best when it protects ideas we condemn, so too does judicial
independence require the protection of decisions that appear wrong, so
long as they are honestly wrong.5
This last lesson seems to have been ignored by critics of Federal
District Court Judge Harold Baer. In a well-reported, if not exactly
celebrated, narcotics case, Judge Baer suppressed evidence of more than
eighty pounds of cocaine seized by police officers in New York City's
Washington Heights neighborhood.6 The decision itself seems hard to
justify, based as it was on Judge Baer's conclusion that it might be
reasonable behavior (and therefore not suspicious or furtive) for people
to run from the police.7 But Judge Baer's real mistake came in issuing
the opinion at the beginning of the 1996 presidential campaign. Thus, it
was quickly seized upon by prominent Republicans as a club with which
to flail President Clinton. In calling for Judge Baer's impeachment,
eventual presidential nominee Robert Dole stated, "'We don't need
judges who try to find excuses for more criminal behavior."'" Echoed
Republican Senator Orrin G. Hatch of Utah, "'The President talks about
putting cops on the beat, yet he appoints judges who are putting
criminals back on the street."' 9
Although President Clinton could not bring himself to support Judge
Baer's independence, numerous commentators, including myself,"° have
pointed out the folly and danger of castigating judges on the basis of

5. I do not mean to suggest that judges may never face reproval for actions taken on the
bench. Discipline may be appropriate where the judge's decision was prompted by bad fhith, bias,
improper influence, intentional refusal to follow the law, or some other ill motive. Nor is judicial
independence threatened when a judge is disciplined for a pattern of repeated legal errors, or when
the judge commits an error so egregious as to indicate lack of competence. See id. § 2.02, at 32-37.
6. See United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Within a few weeks,
Judge Baer granted the government's motion for a rehearing and vacated his earlier decision. See
United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
7. See Bayless, 913 F. Supp. at 241-42.
8. Katharine Q. Seelye, A Get-Tough Message at California'sDeath Row, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
24, 1996, § I, at 29.
9. Eric Schmitt, SenatorRenews Attack on Clinton'sJudges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1996, at

B9.
10. See Steven Lubet, The PresidentialCampaign Is Off to a Dirty Start, NAT'L LJ., Apr. 22,
1996, at A23.
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their decisions. Every such sling and arrow has the potential to weaken

or even crack our civic commitment to judicial independence.
I raise the case of Judge Baer, however, not to rehearse its facts or
to renew the liberal defense of his discretion. Rather, I want to point out
that intolerance of judicial diversity, and consequently of judicial
independence, is not limited to the political right. Liberals have also been
known to flog judges with whom they disagree.

Consider Justice Antonin Scalia's recent remarks at a prayer
breakfast sponsored by the Christian Legal Society. At the breakfast,

Justice Scalia spoke about his religious belief in miracles, and the scorn
he believes that secular, "'worldly wise' elites heap upon Christian
believers. 1 The Washington Post reported the speech as follows:
"The wise do not believe in the resurrection of the dead. It is
really quite absurd".... "[E]verything from the Easter morning to the
Ascension had to be made up by the groveling enthusiasts as part of
their plan to get themselves martyred."
"To be honest about it, that is the view of Christians taken by
modem society".... "Surely those who adhere to all or most of these
traditional Christian beliefs are to be regarded as simple-minded."' 2
While not rising to Baer-like levels or calls for impeachment, the
criticism of Justice Scalia was stinging. One critic, identified only as a
practicing attorney and ethics expert, said he was "shocked," complaining
that a Supreme Court justice "'shouldn't be saying anything like that
because it's going to come up before the court.""..3 The legal director
of People for the American Way referred to Scalia's words as
"'troubling"' and "'disturbing,"' since they appeared to parallel the views4
of religious conservative leaders Pat Robertson and Patrick Buchanan.'
A spokesman for Americans United for Separation of Church and State
accused Justice Scalia of "'undermin[ing] public confidence in his
objectivity,""... and the director of the Baptist Joint
Committee labeled
' 6
the Justice's views "'a right-wing litmus test."" 1

11.

Clay Chandler, Scalia'sReligion Remark: Just a Matter ofFree Speech?, WASH. POST,

Apr. 15, 1996, at F7.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Ray Archer, Religion in America: Media Scorn Is Showing, Telling, AIZ. REPUBUC, May
6, 1996, at B4.
16. Edd Doerr, Scalia's Chutzpah, Clinton's Veto, HUMANIsT, July-Aug. 1996, at 33.
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For our present purpose, the most interesting response came from
a professor of constitutional law who stated that Scalia "'stepped over the
line of what is proper,'" going on to say that "'[w]e expect Supreme
Court justices to be the most secular of our public servants. That is not
to say they can't have religious beliefs. But for good reasons, we are
uncomfortable about them flaunting those beliefs.', 17 In little more than
a sentence, then, it was posited that Justice Scalia was guilty of impropriety, that Justices must be "secular," and that Justice Scalia in particular
should keep his religious opinions to himself.
What does this say about the principle of judicial independence?
After all, Justice Scalia was neither subjected to discipline nor threatened
with removal. And certainly someone possessing his famous wit and
combativeness can easily withstand a few adverse quotes in the popular
press.
All true. Still, it is disquieting to think that a judge's expression of
religious belief might result in calls for a certain orthodoxy among the
judiciary, even if it is presented as a tolerant orthodoxy. Tolerance is as
tolerance does, one might well suggest. The critics of Judge Harold Baer
might also claim tolerance, arguing only that Judge Baer "stepped over
the line."
A truly independent American judiciary must necessarily be
comprised of Americans of all descriptions. That includes the secular and
the faithful; the doubters and the believers. The suitablilty of a person for
judicial office must not be measured by the depth or expression of his or
her religious beliefs. It undermines the very premise of our system to
suggest, as some did, that Justice Scalia could not preside fairly over
religion cases. We expect judges to interpret the law as they discern it,
to stand by their beliefs in the face of unpopularity or pressure, and to
represent (in the broadest sense) the entire spectrum of the American
people. How can this principle endure if there is no room on the
Supreme Court for a Justice who expresses his belief in miracles?
Judicial independence is a fragile concept. It is popular at the
highest level of abstraction, but it regularly loses support in the face of
rulings or statements that clash with various notions of correctitude.
There is a line that runs (though not always) from criticism of ideas to
calls for impeachment to ruling-based discipline. If we truly adhere to the
ideal of judicial independence, we must sustain it when we believe in the
results, and even more when we do not.

17.

Chandler, supra note 11, at F7.
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